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Rhys Hester, Richard S. Frase, Julian V. Roberts,
and Kelly Lyn Mitchell

Prior Record Enhancements
at Sentencing: Unsettled
Justiﬁcations and Unsettling
Consequences

ABSTRACT

The consequences of a person’s prior crimes remain after the debt to society is
paid and the sentence is discharged. While the practice of using prior
convictions to enhance the severity of sentence imposed is universal, prior
record enhancements (PREs) play a particularly important role in US sentencing, and especially in guidelines jurisdictions. In grid-based guidelines,
criminal history constitutes one of the two dimensions of the grid. The
enhancements are hard to justify. Retributive theories generally reject the use
of robust, cumulative record-based enhancements. Research into recidivism
suggests that the preventive beneﬁts of PREs have been overstated. The
public support the consideration of prior convictions at sentencing, but there
is convincing evidence that people are less punitive in their views than are
many US guideline schemes. PREs exacerbate racial disparities in prison
admissions and populations, result in signiﬁcant additional prison costs, undermine offense-based proportionality, and disrupt prison resource prioritization.
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fect one’s life for decades by impairing job prospects, limiting eligibility
for social programs and beneﬁts, and imposing social stigma. Individuals
pay for their crimes once and then pay over and over again. Nowhere is
the impact of prior convictions more direct or more palpable than at sentencing for a new offense. People with histories of prior crimes are sent to
prison more often and for longer, practices we refer to as prior record
enhancements (PREs).1 Sometimes offenders are punished for the past
under three-strikes, habitual offender, and career criminal laws that mandate starkly harsher punishments for repeat offenders. In other instances
this increased punishment for past actions occurs because sentencing
guidelines systems weight criminal history heavily.
Prior record enhancements are not unique to the United States, although like current punishment practices generally, the extent of additional punishment from PREs in the United States is exceptional. In other
countries, prior convictions normally carry only a modest enhancement
relative to the punishment imposed on ﬁrst offenders (e.g., Roberts and
Pina-Sánchez 2014, 2015). In countries without formal guidelines (most
jurisdictions) it is hard to determine how much weight prior convictions
carry at sentencing or which dimensions of criminal history are inﬂuential. Most jurisdictions (including New Zealand, Canada, and Australia)
leave the interpretation of an offender’s record, and the weight it should
carry, to the discretion of trial courts (see Roberts 2008). This is also true
in US states without guidelines, which constitute slightly more than half
of US jurisdictions. As with nonguidelines nations, it is difﬁcult to gauge
the magnitude of PREs in US nonguidelines states because of a lack of data.
There are, however, some indications that PREs are more pronounced
under guidelines, at least in terms of multiplying prison sentence lengths
(as opposed to their effect on in-out decisions; Hester 2017).
In many US states, sentencing guidelines provide detailed rules regulating the ways prior convictions should be counted, as well as the speciﬁc
weight they should have on sentence outcomes; judicial discretion is
curbed in the interests of promoting greater consistency across cases.
The quest for uniformity and consistency led to mechanical quantiﬁcation
of many of the factors important to sentencing, such as the circumstances

School. Julian V. Roberts is professor of criminology, University of Oxford. Kelly Lyn
Mitchell is executive director, Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice.
1

We interchangeably use the term “criminal history enhancements.”
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of the crime and characteristics of the offender, including his or her prior
record. Guidelines create rules for scoring this information; the majority
of guidelines jurisdictions use a sentencing matrix or grid to recommend a
sentence based on the severity of the current offense and the offender’s
prior record. Offenders with the highest criminal history scores receive
prison recommendations that are often many times greater than the sentences recommended for ﬁrst-time offenders convicted of the same offense. On average, across all guidelines systems, record-based prison length
enhancements produce a sixfold increase in punishment, although there
is considerable variation among the systems (Frase and Hester, forthcoming b). At the high end, some state grids impose over a 10-fold average increase. For some offense categories the multiplier is an astounding 30.2 When the multiplier is that high, only 3 percent of individuals’
current sentence can be considered punishment for the crime they are
being convicted of; 97 percent is allocated for prior behavior for which
they have already been convicted and sentenced and for which they have
already satisﬁed their debt to society.
Despite the universal nature of record-based sentencing enhancements and the signiﬁcant effects they have on sentencing outcomes, the
subject attracted little attention from scholars until relatively recently.3
For many observers, PREs may seem like an uncontroversial element
of contemporary sentencing, as unproblematic as increasing the severity
of punishment to reﬂect the seriousness of the current crime. But on closer
inspection enhancements raise important and unsettling issues.
There is no uniform concept of “criminal history” or “prior record,”
and jurisdictions vary widely in the factors they mechanically incorporate
in prior record scores. A “prior record” can mean a plethora of different
things: A person with a single, 30-year-old misdemeanor; an individual

2
This example comes from seriousness level III of the Washington guidelines. Offenders with an offender score of 0 are recommended for 2 months’ incarceration while
offenders in the highest offender score category of 91 are recommended for 59.5 months—
just short of 5 years. These are main-grid average multipliers; on some specialized grids and
offense levels, the high-low ratios are even higher (e.g., on level VII of the Maryland property crimes grid, the multiplier is 96).
3
For a recent survey of all US guidelines systems employing some sort of criminal history score, see Frase et al. (2015). This survey is part of a major research project at the University of Minnesota’s Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice ( http://
robinainstitute.umn.edu/areas-expertise/criminal-history-enhancements). Several other recent works have examined the rationales for PREs (see, e.g., Roberts and von Hirsch 2010;
Tamburrini and Ryberg 2012).
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with a few drug and property felonies; a person with a string of robbery
and attempted murder convictions; and an individual with scores of burglary and theft crimes over the course of decades—all have “a record.”
Second, intuition aside, articulating the justiﬁcations for PREs—on both
retributive and risk-based grounds—proves a more difﬁcult task than
many people might imagine. As we discuss in detail below, retributive
sentencing theorists have failed to agree on a justiﬁcation for PRE policies that garners widespread endorsement (Roberts and von Hirsch 2010).
And while consequentialist theories posit that sanctions might rehabilitate, deter, or incapacitate, the empirical literature suggests that more
severe sanctions are ineffective in reducing crime (Nagin 2013). Third,
PRE practices have signiﬁcant unintended consequences: exacerbating
race disparities, confounding offense-based proportionality, and disrupting prison resource prioritization. As a result, prison populations are full
of older, less violent offenders who are more likely to be persons of color—
all at great cost and little beneﬁt to the public.
A generation ago, Crime and Justice published the ﬁrst review of the research and practice of prior record enhancements, with a focus on US systems (Roberts 1997b). In this essay we revisit these important issues, drawing on a resurgence of writing and research. Over the past two decades,
retributive theorists have revisited the relevance of prior convictions. Several early retributive writers took the position that prior convictions do
not affect the seriousness of the crime or the offender’s culpability and
therefore have no place in the sentencing equation (e.g., Fletcher 1978;
Singer 1979). But von Hirsch (1976) set forth a retributive argument for
enhancing punishment on the basis of prior record; his view, that culpability increased along with the number of prior convictions, inﬂuenced the
earliest sentencing guidelines commissions in states such as Minnesota
and Washington (Parent 1988; Boerner and Lieb 2001). A recent wave of
scholarship has reopened the debate. Von Hirsch subsequently amended
his earlier view and now endorses a more limited role for enhancing sentences on retributive grounds (von Hirsch 2010). Others continue to
struggle to articulate retributivist justiﬁcations (see, e.g., Roberts 2008;
Lee 2009, 2010; Frase 2010, 2013).
The empirical literature on the relationship between prior and future
offending has grown signiﬁcantly in recent years, yielding many new
insights. The link between past and future crime could justify PREs on
utilitarian, preventive grounds. Here, too, received wisdom has evolved.
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It is likely that some priors, and some dimensions of criminal history,
have more predictive power than others (Frase 2015a). An important line
of research has documented the declining signiﬁcance of prior convictions for the purposes of predicting future crime: after a number of years,
the predictive power of a criminal conviction declines (e.g., Kurleycheck,
Brame, and Bushway 2006, 2007; Blumstein and Nakamura 2009; cf.
Bushway, Nieuwbeerta, and Blokland 2011). Analyses have also questioned the complacent assumption that repeat offenders always represent
a higher risk of reoffending, and research has led to a more nuanced evaluation of which dimensions of an offender’s criminal history score predict reoffending most reliably. This research has had modest inﬂuence
on sentencing commissions. For example, the US Sentencing Commission removed its “recency premium,” which had imposed additional punishment when the priors were committed in a relatively short period
prior to the current offense, because it contributed little to the predictive
accuracy of the criminal history score (US Sentencing Commission 2010).
Mostly, though, state commissions have made little effort to examine
or evaluate their PRE policies.
Furthermore, even if a criminal history score successfully predicts a
higher likelihood of future offending, the question of the appropriate enhancement is far from settled. What utilitarian purpose is served by doubling, tripling, or imposing a sixfold increase in prison time on an individual who is actuarially more likely (though not certain) to reoffend in
the future? The most obvious answers are that increasing the penalty
should speciﬁcally deter the person being punished and should reduce
crime through incapacitation. We address these issues for the ﬁrst time
in the context of PREs, drawing on a growing body of literature that ﬁnds
no speciﬁc deterrent effect of longer prison terms and that frequently
reports modest effects in the opposite direction: that prison tends to increase, not reduce, a person’s likelihood of reoffending. We also discuss
serious problems in justifying PREs across the board on the basis of incapacitation. Lower-level, nonviolent offenders have higher rates of recidivism; since prison is such an expensive endeavor, it is doubtful that
the costs of additional years in prison are worth the beneﬁts in preventing
low-level property, drug, and public order offenses through incapacitation.
As a consequence of new public opinion research, we are now better
placed to understand social reaction to prior record enhancements. One
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barrier to revising criminal history enhancements has long been public
support for the practice (Roberts 2008). We are learning that public support may be less robust than was previously thought and founded on unrealistic expectations of the preventive efﬁcacy of PREs. Finally, research
has exposed a number of adverse, unintended consequences of PREs.
They have a clearly disproportionate impact on racial minorities. Frase
(2009) has demonstrated that most of the racial disparity introduced at
the sentencing phase in Minnesota arises as a result of the criminal history
axis of the Minnesota grid. Similar effects exist in other guidelines states
(Frase and Hester 2015). This disproportionate impact is but one unintended consequence of PREs and serves as a salutary reminder that apparently race-neutral sentencing practices can have very different effects on
certain proﬁles of offenders (Tonry 2011).
Here is how this essay is organized. In Section I we provide an overview of PREs, how they are deﬁned and used, and how scores differ
across jurisdictions. We also discuss the considerable variation in the levels of additional punishment imposed for a prior record. In Section II we
review the literature on the justiﬁcations of punishment in the context
of PREs. Despite the intuitive appeal of PREs, the articulation of a convincing retributive-based account of the punishment enhancements has
proven elusive. While some severity premium may be appropriate on desert grounds, retributive theory also imposes a limitation on the degree of
prior record enhancement in a way that is not currently recognized by
most sentencing guidelines jurisdictions. We further conclude, on the
best current evidence, that PREs as presently conceived cannot be justiﬁed on consequentialist grounds of rehabilitation or deterrence. Acrossthe-board, nonselective incapacitation is also a poor ﬁt. In Section III,
we turn to the adverse impacts of PREs, which include exacerbating racial disparities, undermining offense-based proportionality, confounding prison use priorities, and imposing severe ﬁnancial impacts on the
strained prison system. Section IV concludes with suggestions for future
research and a brief sketch of a model approach to PREs. We identify
troubling components that should not be included in criminal history
scores, suggest upper limits on the effect that prior record should have
on sentence lengths, describe several appropriate ﬁrst-offender mitigation rules, and propose that judges should have express authority to depart from recommended sentences in light of case-speciﬁc prior record
circumstances. If guidelines systems were to adopt these provisions,
jurisdictions could substantially reduce costs and reshape their sentenc-
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ing systems to be fairer, more proportional, and more efﬁcient—all without detriment to public safety.

I. Use of Prior Record Enhancements
An offender’s criminal history is frequently considered an important factor for sentencing in both determinate and indeterminate sentencing systems, and criminal history has been built into every sentencing guidelines
scheme as one key dimension (Roberts 1997a; Frase et al. 2015; Tonry
2016). For jurisdictions that use a sentencing grid, criminal history represents one axis on the grid while offense severity forms the other, and
the presumptive sentence lies at the intersection of the two. For guidelines jurisdictions that do not use a grid, criminal history is usually computed on a worksheet, and the resulting points, when added to points relating to offense severity, determine the recommended sentence.
The universal use of prior record in guidelines masks great diversity.
Variation exists on the dimensions included in the score, in how items
are weighted, and on the magnitude of increased punishment based on
higher criminal history scores. Prior record is universally used, but how
it is used is far from universal.
A. Scoring Criminal History
Criminal history scores are composed of multiple elements that vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Criminal history almost always includes
some accounting of prior felonies and misdemeanors, but these offenses
are not simply tallied pursuant to a universally agreed-on formula. In
most jurisdictions, felony points are added on the basis of severity level
or offense classiﬁcation, with different point weights assigned to different
classiﬁcations. For example, in Arkansas possible point values are .25, .5,
or 1; in Minnesota .5, 1, 1.5, 2, or 3; in North Carolina 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, or 10;
under the Florida worksheet system, point values range from .2 to 29
(Hester 2015). Misdemeanors likewise are assigned points, almost always
valued lower than felonies, and often several misdemeanors are required
to garner one criminal history point. Some jurisdictions incorporate
“patterning” rules under which similar priors are given even greater
weight (Wright 2002; Roberts 2015b).
Prior record scores often include factors such as current custody status
(whether the offender was under some type of supervision or incarcera-
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tion when the offense was committed) or prior probation violations
(Roberts 1997b). Some jurisdictions broadly deﬁne prior offenses so that
when multiple current offenses are sentenced, each is included in the
criminal history on the next offense to be sentenced (Frase 2015c). In
contrast, a few jurisdictions incorporate decay or gap rules that wash out
or eliminate prior offenses from the criminal history score if they are very
old or if the individual was crime-free for a speciﬁed number of years
(Mitchell 2015).
Almost all states include juvenile adjudications in criminal history
scores, although for other purposes courts are increasingly being inﬂuenced by research demonstrating the different cognitive functioning of
adolescents (Monahan, Skeem, and Lowenkamp 2017). North Carolina
is the only state that does not include juvenile adjudications in the prior
record score, but juveniles are processed in adult court once they reach
age 16 (N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7B-1604 [2016]). In some jurisdictions juvenile priors are underweighted or points are capped so that they do not
weigh as heavily as adult convictions. Important court decisions have declared juveniles to be less culpable on the basis of the research that shows,
for instance, that parts of the brain in the frontal lobe associated with regulating aggression, long-range planning, abstract thinking, and perhaps
even moral judgment are not fully formed until adulthood (Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 [2005]; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 [2010];
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 [2012]). Whether the cognitive research
cited in the Roper-Graham-Miller line of cases will inﬂuence how guidelines deal with prior juvenile offenses remains an open question. The
moral justiﬁcation for enhancing punishment on the basis of acts committed as a juvenile may be on more tenuous grounds than for PREs imposed for adult convictions. Moreover, juvenile proceedings generally
have fewer procedural safeguards (no right to a jury trial, limited presence and effectiveness of counsel) and are designed for a different purpose (rehabilitation) than adult proceedings. Juvenile adjudications may
thus not be as reliable or factually accurate as adult convictions (see, generally, Feld [2003]). However, individuals who begin offending at an early
age tend to have longer criminal careers and to commit more offenses on
average than individuals who begin offending later in their lives (Farrington 2012). Thus, age at onset may be highly relevant to the risk and
public safety calculus, thereby justifying the inclusion of some recognition
of the juvenile record in the criminal history score.
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These criminal history scoring rules operate behind the scenes: in the
texts of statutes or guidelines, on case worksheets, and in case management software. They are not apparent from a given grid, which simply
refers to an aggregate score or category. As a result, these various scoring, weighting, limitation, exclusion, and inclusion rules are out of public view and likely get taken for granted. The point we stress is that not
all criminal history scores are the same. Jurisdictions include many
factors that can inﬂate scores—guidelines policy decisions that translate
into substantial increases in the punishment imposed.
B. Magnitude of Criminal History Enhancements
Separate from how scores are calculated is the issue of how enhancements based on those scores are implemented. We refer to this as the
“magnitude” of prior record enhancement. The magnitude of a PRE is
the amount of additional punishment imposed at sentencing solely attributable to criminal history. Enhancement magnitude affects both
dispositions (when a person receives a prison sentence rather than probation) and durations (when a person receives a longer prison term). To illustrate, consider ﬁgure 1, which shows two rows of the Minnesota standard grid.
The numbers in the grid cells represent the recommended punishment in months. At some levels, as represented by severity level 7, the
grid addresses both the prison disposition decision and sentence duration. The three shaded cells on the far left side of row 7 indicate a recommendation of a stayed prison sentence, meaning the guidelines recom-

FIG. 1.—Excerpt from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines grid. Source: Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (2017, p. 79).
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mend probation; the durations shown in these cells of 36, 42, or 48
months indicate the prison sentence that should be imposed if the offender does not successfully complete probation. For severity level 7,
an offender with a criminal history score of 2 would receive probation
and a suspended 48-month prison sentence while an offender with a
criminal history score of 3 would receive a 54-month executed prison
sentence. In a metaphorical sense, the difference in outcomes is night
and day. In a literal sense, the difference is 1,620 nights and days in prison
rather than on probation, all because of a single additional criminal history point.
For higher rows on the grid (e.g., severity level 8), all convicted offenders are recommended for executed prison sentences, regardless of
criminal history. At all offense severity levels, higher criminal history
scores receive longer recommended prison terms. An individual guilty
of a level 8 offense who has a criminal history score of 6 or more is recommended for 108 months, which is 2.25 times longer than the 48 months
recommended for a criminal history score of 0 (108/48 p 2.25). We refer
to this durational measure as the “multiplier” and use it to quantify how
much more prison time is imposed because of prior record. We average
the multipliers for all of the severity levels on a grid to produce an overall
multiplier ﬁgure for the grid as a whole.
Using this method, we compared 12 US grid-based guidelines systems
and found a remarkable degree of variation in overall enhancement
multipliers, which ranged from 1.7 to 14.4 with an average across all of
the systems of 6.4 (Frase and Hester 2015). Figure 2 provides a bar chart
with the results of this 12-jurisdiction comparison. In Washington, DC,
offenders in the highest criminal history category have recommended
prison terms 70 percent longer than offenders in the lowest history category, while in Kansas the high-history recommendation is 1,340 percent longer. The average multiplier of 6.4, for all 12 systems, represents
a 540 percent increase from lowest to highest.
One can also look at these multipliers in terms of months and years
in prison. The average multiplier of 6.4 means that, if a ﬁrst offender is
recommended for a particular crime to 18 months in prison, the highhistory offender attracts a recommended sentence of 115 months for
the same offense. The additional 97 months is attributable to the second
offender’s prior record—offenses for which he has already been found
guilty, been sentenced, and satisﬁed his debt to society. Yet those past satisﬁed debts account for 84 percent of his total sentence.
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FIG. 2.—Criminal history enhancements, 12 jurisdictions. Calculations are based on published
grids as of 2012. For jurisdictions with multiple grids, only the primary grid is reported. Source:
Frase and Hester (2015).

Given this diversity of magnitudes, we question whether PREs can be
justiﬁed as currently conceived and implemented in these 12 jurisdictions.
If PREs can be supported on retributive grounds, surely some jurisdictions are fundamentally under- or overpunishing offenders with prior
records. Similarly, if PREs are justiﬁed on utilitarian harm-prevention
grounds, the vast magnitude of the ranges suggests that some jurisdictions
must be under- or overpunishing in the name of risk reduction. But invoking an appropriate limit on PREs assumes that the imposition of a prior
record enhancement is indeed justiﬁable. Despite the widespread intuitive
appeal of PREs, convincingly articulating a justiﬁcation for their imposition is a challenge.
In addition to the guidelines criminal history enhancements discussed
above, it is important to keep in mind that prior convictions can also enhance sentence severity—often with an even greater magnitude—through
policies such as three-strikes and habitual offender laws. For example, in
three-strikes jurisdictions, offenders convicted of speciﬁed offenses can receive sentences as severe as 25 years to life, or life without parole, when
they have the requisite prior felony record (see, e.g., Ewing v. California,
538 U.S. 11 [2003]). In many places the present and past felonies have
to be serious violent offenses, but other places include drug offenses and
nonviolent felonies. Habitual offender laws work in a similar way, though
they usually target a speciﬁc category of repeat offending (e.g., burglaries).
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Regardless of the mechanism—whether a three-strikes statute, habitual offender law, or guidelines criminal history score—the decision to
enhance a penalty on the basis of past convictions must be supported
by one or more accepted purposes of punishment. Such justiﬁcation is
often weak or entirely lacking.

II. Questioning the Justiﬁcations
In this section we examine the justiﬁcations for criminal history
enhancements. We ﬁrst review attempts to justify enhancements using
retributive punishment theory. We then turn to consequentialist theories and discuss how, even if a guidelines system’s criminal history score
is empirically validated as predictive of reoffending, the resulting increases in punishment must be tied to reductions in offending. We review the literature in this area and show that committal to prison and
longer prison terms do not rehabilitate and do not seem to deter (specifically or generally). Worse, the prison experience may actually make
some offenders more likely to reoffend than they would have been without a prison term. For some offenses such as drug trafﬁcking, incapacitation does not reduce crime because of replacement effects. For other
offenses, incapacitation may reduce crime but at signiﬁcant cost and, often, with declining crime control beneﬁts due to offender aging. In
short, an across-the-board policy to enhance punishment for recidivists
at all offending levels cannot be justiﬁed on either retributive or consequentialist grounds.
A. The Unsettled Retributive Justiﬁcations
A retributive rationale for prior record enhancements is commonly
assumed or asserted by sentencing commissions, judges, and other policy makers (Roberts 2015a), but the speciﬁc reasons for this rationale are
rarely expounded. In this section we review the work of sentencing
philosophers whose ideas have been widely divergent. Writers who accept a retributive justiﬁcation for prior record enhancements disagree
about whether and to what extent prior record can be viewed as an aggravating factor, or whether it should be only a mitigating factor for
offenders with little or no criminal record. Some writers maintain that
there is no convincing retributive justiﬁcation at all.
Most desert theorists agree that a person’s desert, or moral blameworthiness, depends on two basic factors (von Hirsch 1993, pp. 29–33). First

Prior Record Enhancements

221

is the seriousness of the harms that person has caused or risked by his
criminal acts (offense factors). Second is the person’s individual culpability in committing those acts (offender factors), as measured by such
things as his or her degree of culpable intent (mens rea); good or bad
motives; situational pressures; mental or emotional conditions that may
diminish the offender’s capacity to obey the law; and, for multi-offender
crimes, that offender’s greater or lesser role in the crime. Most desertbased theories have assumed that prior record enhancements must be justiﬁed by variations in the second (offender culpability) factor, though a
few writers have suggested a harm-based retributive rationale.
Any retributive prior record enhancement theory must establish that
prior convictions make the offender more blameworthy, in terms of increased offender culpability or increased offense harm, for the current
offense. An offender with many prior convictions may very well be more
blameworthy in an overall sense, but he cannot now be given more punishment for his prior crimes because he has already been punished for
those; added punishment for these priors would be inconsistent with
the values that underlie constitutional double jeopardy principles. The
task for the retributive theorist is to articulate why an individual’s past
convictions, for which he has already been punished and satisﬁed his
debt, now make that individual more culpable for the current offense.
1. Reduced Culpability of Offenders with Little or No Prior Record. Most
of the retributive theories we discuss regard prior record as an aggravator: culpability increases with the number of past convictions. However, we ﬁrst discuss theories that view the issue from the opposite angle:
theories of mitigation that propose that offenders with few or no prior
convictions deserve less punishment than would otherwise attach to a
crime of this nature. Rather than aggravating for the recidivist, these theories mitigate for the novice. There are two basic varieties of this theory.
One grants mitigation only to ﬁrst offenders; the other grants a steadily
declining degree of mitigation as offenders acquire more prior convictions, until at some point no mitigation applies (the latter version is sometimes referred to as progressive loss of mitigation; von Hirsch 2010). The
basic distinction is whether a person gets a second chance or instead perhaps a third, fourth, or ﬁfth chance, with the punishment increasing each
time up until the point the offender receives the fully deserved punishment with no mitigation.
Both versions of this theory argue that ﬁrst offenders can plausibly
claim that their offense was out of character and that society should
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be less willing to fully convert its condemnation of the offender’s criminal act into condemnation of the actor (von Hirsch 1985; Wasik and
von Hirsch 1994; Ashworth 2005; Roberts 2010). Von Hirsch (1985,
pp. 83–85) argues that, given human frailty, some sympathy and understanding are due to an offender’s ﬁrst “lapse” (although this argument
seems more like an appeal to mercy than a claim of reduced culpability).
Some writers would continue to permit mitigation for a third offense, or
even a fourth, although the rationale for mitigation becomes strained at
that point (Roberts 2010).
Each version of mitigation theory has advantages and disadvantages.
Broader versions are more congruent with actual law and practice, which
often call for a continuing escalation of penalties for each additional
prior conviction. But, as noted above, such theories are unconvincing
when applied to an offender with several prior convictions. The desert
grounds for granting leniency to ﬁrst offenders seem more convincing,
and such leniency enjoys widespread acceptance among scholars (e.g.,
O’Neill, Maxﬁeld, and Harer 2004). But an approach that considered
only prior record when sentencing ﬁrst offenders may confront strong
opposition from practitioners and policy makers because it would invalidate much of current sentencing law and practice. Both kinds of
reduced-desert theory have been criticized as inappropriate when sentencing serious crimes or crimes that involve extensive planning (Roberts 2012).
However, reduced-desert theories have one very important advantage
over “aggravation” rationales, all of which posit enhanced culpability for
second and subsequent crimes. The reduced-desert approach has a clear
upper limit, based on desert factors associated with the current offense,
whereas the logic of enhanced-desert theories seems to permit an
open-ended escalation of sanction severity (von Hirsch 2010). The idea
that the current offense should set an upper limit on sanction severity
ﬁnds support in sentencing guidelines systems, all of which recognize
an offense-based “cap” beyond which criminal history no longer raises
the guidelines recommended sentence. For example, under the Minnesota guidelines the criminal history point score is capped at “6 or more”
(see ﬁg. 1). Thus, while an offender could potentially accumulate 10, 20,
or more criminal history points, the PRE enhancement ceases after 6.
Consider again the example offered in the introduction in which 97 percent of an offender’s sentence is attributable not to the current criminal
act but to prior record: at some point, an ever-increasing criminal history
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enhancement leads to absurdity. The next ﬁve sections examine “aggravation” theories, positing that repeat offenders become increasingly
blameworthy with each additional prior conviction.
2. Bad Character. Character theories of enhanced punishment for
repeat offenders seem to be based on the idea that such offenders have
shown themselves to be more and more wicked and indifferent to the
rights of others with each additional crime (Lee 2009, 2010). But
punishing bad character violates the fundamental principle that people
are punished for what they have done (and with what intent), not for
who or what they are (Bagaric 2000; Tonry 2010). Indeed, punishment
simply for one’s status (e.g., being an addict) is unconstitutional
(Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 [1962]).
There are also practical problems in applying this approach: how
much more blameworthy does the offender become with each additional
crime, and is there any upper limit to penalty enhancements? Character
theories can eventually lead to the conclusion that the offender is such an
outlaw that he has forfeited any right to have his punishment limited by
retributive, human rights, or other deontological principles. Such an
open-ended forfeiture concept may indeed be the core rationale of
three-strikes and repeat and career offender statutes, which almost all
retributive scholars oppose.
3. Heightened Notice and Deﬁance. Two other aggravated-blame theories—notice and deﬁance—posit enhanced culpability for offenders
who, after receiving formal condemnation of their prior criminal acts,
ignore society’s explicit warning and commit further crime in open deﬁance of these warnings and the law (Lee 2009). Both types of theory
appear to assume that the current offense was committed after conviction and sentence for the prior crime; notice theory may also assume
substantial similarity between the prior and the current offense. The offender was previously warned: “don’t commit this crime.” However,
criminal record enhancement rules are often much broader in each of
these respects. Thus, many sentencing guidelines systems count as “priors” convictions that were entered after the current offense was committed (Frase 2015b). And almost all courts consider prior convictions
even if they were for very different kinds of crimes (although similar
priors sometimes receive extra weight; Roberts 2015b). Notice theory
also seems inapplicable to very serious crimes such as murder and armed
robbery, as to which moral values and legal prohibitions are not seriously in doubt. And the theory provides no clear rationale to impose
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further enhancement of punishment severity for a third, fourth, or ﬁfth
offense.
As for deﬁance theories, there is considerable doubt that such a rationale is acceptable in a legal system in which people are punished for their
acts, not their thoughts and attitudes (von Hirsch 1985, pp. 79–80). One
possible answer to this criticism might invoke an expressive theory (e.g.,
Hampton 1984) according to which offenders are punished to repudiate
their false moral claim to act without regard to the rights of others or of
society; arguably, such false claims grow more offensive with each additional crime. As we discuss below, a version of this rationale for enhancement can also be supported under a consequentialist, “denunciation” theory. But under either type of deﬁance theory it is entirely unclear how
much enhancement is allowed, and with what limits.
4. Omission Theories. This theory is elaborated in detail by Youngjae
Lee (2009, 2010) and has also been advocated by other writers (MacPherson 2002; Bennett 2010, 2012; Dagger 2012). It argues that a repeat
offender’s culpability is enhanced because he has failed to take appropriate action to control his criminal tendencies in light of his earlier
crime, conviction, and punishment. Lee’s theory seems to assume that,
because of the prior convictions, the offender is or ought to be aware
of his or her heightened risk of offending. From this actual or constructive awareness Lee derives a heightened duty on the parts of offenders to
rearrange their lives in ways that ensure they will avoid further criminality. Christopher Bennett (2010) restates Lee’s theory in terms of a communicative theory; on this view, punishment symbolizes how sorry an offender ought to feel and, therefore, how strong an obligation he or she
has not to offend again.
Compared to some of the desert theories previously discussed, this
theory has the potential to better explain rules that steadily escalate sentence severity as the number of prior convictions increases: the duty of
the offender to control his criminal tendencies becomes steadily more
important and obvious. This theory also offers a workable formula for
determining how much to enhance the repeat offender’s sentence and
when to discontinue further enhancement for additional prior convictions: since the theory blames offenders for failing to address their manifest risk of reoffending and since risking harm is less culpable than actually causing harm, the added penalty for the former should not exceed the
penalty for the latter (Lee 2010, p. 67). In practical terms, this translates
into a rule of thumb that prior record, no matter how extensive, should
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never account for more than half of the total sentence. Stated differently,
offenders with the longest records should not receive penalties more than
twice as severe as penalties given to ﬁrst offenders who commit the same
offense (Frase 2013, p. 185).
However, omission theory suffers from some of the defects of aggravation theories discussed above: it seems to apply mainly to offenders
whose past and current crimes are similar, or at least caused by the same
risk factors, and it seems to explain only prior record enhancements involving a conviction entered before the current offense was committed.
In addition, such a theory might require courts to engage in difﬁcult
assessments of the extent to which the offender tried but was unable
to control his criminal tendencies. More fundamentally, the theory does
not convincingly explain why convicted offenders should be deemed to
have a higher duty than anyone else to avoid committing crimes. Finally,
the theory violates the general principle that liability for an omission is
exceptional in the criminal laws of the United States and other common
law countries and can exist only where a duty to perform the required act
has previously been clearly established by statute, case law, or other
means (Tonry 2010).
5. Reserved-Desert Theory. Other writers have suggested an enhancement rationale based on the idea that, if the offender did not receive all of
his deserved punishment in one or more prior sentencings, the unimposed “reserved” severity is available to enhance his punishment for
the current crime (Morris 1982, p. 185; Roberts 1997b, pp. 353–54; 2008,
p. 226). However, this theory ﬁnds no support in traditional recidivist
enhancements, which have never been scaled or limited by a reserveddesert concept. Offenders receive prior record enhancements without
regard to the degree of leniency given them in prior cases (Davis 1985,
p. 41). Moreover, the theory yields perverse results; it would dictate that
offenders who were so culpable that they were fully punished in prior
sentencings cannot receive any recidivist premium. This theory would
also be quite difﬁcult to put into effect and, for both practical and legal
reasons, could operate only prospectively (Frase 2010). Courts would
have to begin making express ﬁndings of full desert and reserved desert
at each sentencing; until this became routine, a later court would have
no way of knowing how much desert was reserved in prior sentencings.
Such ﬁndings would also be needed to avoid double jeopardy issues in order to make clear that later sentence enhancements are not additional
punishment for prior crimes; added punishment would be deemed to have
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already been imposed, but suspended, for the earlier crimes. And until the
new system was fully in place, “old system” convictions lacking any express ﬁnding of reserved desert might have to be ignored.
6. Greater-Harm Theory. Most desert theorists seem to assume that
variations in the actual or threatened harm caused by a new offense do
not explain or justify prior record enhancements; the harm to the victim
of the current offense, burglary, for example, is deemed to be the same
regardless of the offender’s prior conviction record (Roberts 2010). But
some writers have suggested that an offender’s prior record of crime may
affect how we view his most recent criminal acts (Durham 1987; Frase
2010; Tamburrini 2012). The repeat offender’s current burglary is perhaps more disturbing, to both the victim and society, in light of—and in
proportion to—his prior crimes. We may conclude that this offender
poses a heightened threat to all of us, and heightened to a degree roughly
proportional to his prior record. This conclusion makes us fearful and
reduces our level of trust in others; it also forces victims and public ofﬁcials to take extra precautions against this offender, which may be expensive or inconvenient. These are real harms associated with the current
offense, foreseeably caused by the offender’s past and current crimes.
One problem in applying this theory is that the supposed greater
harms associated with a recidivist’s crime may be too speculative to permit a proportionately scaled sentence enhancement. Another problem is
the theory’s potential to justify a limitless escalation of sentence severity:
our feelings of fear and distrust, and the extra precautions that victims
and ofﬁcials feel compelled to take, could continue and accelerate with
increases in the offender’s prior record, eventually yielding a penalty
far in excess of the seriousness of the actual crime being sentenced.
The greater-harm theory does not provide any practical formula for deciding how much to enhance for each additional prior offense and when
to stop adding enhancements.
7. Rejection of Any Retributive Rationale. A number of writers have argued that an offender’s prior conviction record is unrelated to his desert
and should have no bearing on the severity of his current sentence
(Fletcher 1978; Singer 1979; Davis 1985; Duff 2001; Tonry 2010; Dagger 2012; Bagaric 2014). Another group of writers have argued that
many offenders with extensive conviction records are actually less culpable than offenders with fewer priors, since the former suffer from psychological, social, or economic handicaps that make it much more difﬁcult for them to obey the law, even after being repeatedly punished
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(Corlett 2012; Petersen 2012; Lippke 2015). Indeed, many of these
handicaps are due to unjust societal conditions, and some are the predictable result of prior punishments imposed on the offender. In short,
these writers conclude that desert is unaffected (or may even be mitigated) by prior convictions.
The view that desert is not increased by prior convictions has much to
commend it given the problems with desert-based enhancement theories. But when combined with a strict view of desert, this approach seems
to rule out any consideration of prior record in determining sentence severity, even as a basis to mitigate penalties for ﬁrst offenders. This view
is thus likely to be ignored by sentencing policy makers and practitioners
and might even discredit desert theory so much as to lead them to ignore
desert principles entirely (Frase 2010, 2013).
8. Intuition and Public Opinion. Finally, we address the apparent intuition among the public that prior crimes make a person more blameworthy.4 As Tonry (2004, p. 117) notes, “Many people have an intuition that
offenders who have previously been convicted of a crime should be dealt
with more harshly.” Research in this area has generated important insights into community attitudes, but there are also a number of unanswered questions. It seems that the public supports prior record enhancements within limits, but the reasons for the support are an unknown mix
of intuition, retribution, and perceived crime control beneﬁts. Consequently, the fundamental takeaways are that the public supports prior record enhancements but also supports limiting them to an extent not reﬂected in most guidelines systems.
Studies across the United States and other nations including Canada,
the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and Russia have found that the
public would impose harsher sentences when the offender has prior
convictions (e.g., Knight 1965; Doob and Roberts 1983; Mande and English 1989; Sanders and Hamilton 1992; Doble 1995; Applegate et al.
1996; Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black 2000; Tufts and Roberts 2002;
for a review of the research, see Roberts [2008, chap. 8]).5 This ﬁnding
4
When asked about important sentencing factors, respondents in Britain, Canada,
Australia, Belgium, and the United States all place previous convictions high on the list
of factors, usually just behind the seriousness of the crime (e.g., Doob and Roberts
1983; Indermaur 1990; Roberts and Hough 2011).
5
The basic ﬁnding that people support prior record enhancements needs to be seen in
context. Research in several countries has shown that people overestimate criminal recidivism rates and underestimate the proportion of offenders who appear for sentencing for
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alone establishes that the “ﬂat rate” desert model, which excludes prior
crimes, is inconsistent with public opinion but fails to resolve the question of whether the public endorses the progressive loss of mitigation
model or an aggravation theory, or is using prior record as a proxy for
consequentialist, risk-based reasons.
A sample of respondents in the United Kingdom were randomly
assigned to read one of three descriptions of a case in which the offender
had no, two, or ﬁve previous convictions and then impose a sentence
(Roberts 2008). The results were consistent with an aggravation theory,
but the premiums did not increase in a linear fashion. The clearest distinctions emerged between the ﬁrst and the second scenarios. Respondents sentencing the ﬁrst offender assigned, on average, a sentence of
28.6 months, compared to 40.9 months for the offender with two priors.
Thus sentence lengths increased by almost half for two prior convictions. However, the increase between the second and third scenarios
was only 12 percent (from 40.95 to 46.22 months). That the magnitude
of the recidivist premium is far more modest at higher levels of criminal
history suggests that the public is sensitive to the threat to conviction
offense proportionality if sentences escalate indeﬁnitely to reﬂect the
number of prior crimes. The public would appear to favor a modiﬁed
version of aggravation in which sentence severity rises to reﬂect the number of prior convictions but is subject to proportional limits. The importance of proportionality emerges from a number of other studies. The
results can also be interpreted as consistent with a progressive loss of mitigation argument.
Several surveys have found that as the recidivist premium results in increasingly disproportionate punishments, public support declines. Subjects in research by Finkel et al. (1996) were asked to sentence a number
of cases, some of which involved ﬁrst offenders, others recidivists. Responses suggested that people sentenced according to a proportionalitybased logic that assigned some limited role to the offender’s previous
convictions. The researchers concluded that “past priors matter and are
taken into account in a punishment calculus: Participants did not limit
their punishment to the last [i.e., instant] offense when they knew there

the ﬁrst time (Roberts and White 1986; Stalans and Diamond 1990; Redondo, Luque, and
Funes 1996; Roberts 1996). Support for these enhancements also likely reﬂects an unjustiﬁed faith in the effectiveness of individual deterrence and a lack of awareness of the costs
associated with robust prior record sentencing enhancements.
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were six priors, but neither did they dramatically, geometrically, or exponentially escalate their punishments because of priors. What we did ﬁnd
is that they sentence in an additive way, with retribution and proportionalism in mind, but refraining from excess” (pp. 481–82).6
In a more recent study we investigated two key questions relating to
prior record enhancements using a national US-based sample (Hester
et al. 2017). We examined whether there should be “look-back” limits
on prior crimes and whether criminal history scores should include juvenile priors. Public responses related to both research questions suggested that most guidelines are more punitive and less forgiving than
the general public.
Respondents were asked whether they would favor a new law that
would prevent judges from considering “old offenses” for the purposes
of sentencing for a current crime. Sixty-ﬁve percent of respondents supported the policy while 35 percent preferred to count all offenses, regardless of their age. Respondents who were in favor of a temporal limit
were asked a follow-up question of how long they thought a prior conviction should remain relevant for the purposes of enhancing subsequent
sentences, with potential responses of 5, 10, 15, and 20 years. Almost
one-quarter of the subsample chose 5 years with a further 53 percent
selecting 10 years. Look-back limits vary considerably across the United
States, but this pattern of responses is more forgiving than current
guideline systems. These responses demonstrate clear public support
for look-back limits on prior crimes.
We also asked respondents to sentence hypothetical cases. For instance, we asked respondents to sentence an offender and, using a withinsubjects design, asked them how changing aspects of the prior record
would change their sentence recommendations. This vignette involved
a current conviction for possession of stolen property; the respondents
ﬁrst sentenced the offender on the basis of information that he was a
ﬁrst-time offender and then received follow-up questions asking how
their sentence would change if he had a prior auto theft conviction 1 year
earlier. The question was repeated two more times with the age of the
prior auto theft changing to 9 and then 14 years. Fifty-six percent of respondents would have increased the sentence for the 1-year-old prior,

6
See also Applegate et al. (1996) for research showing the limits on public support for
recidivist statutes.
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but that fell signiﬁcantly to 21 percent and then 13 percent when the
respondents were asked to assume the prior was 9 and 14 years old.
The public was less punitive as the age of the prior offense increased.
Again, this suggests that the guidelines approach that assigns the same
weight to all priors is inconsistent with, and more punitive than, public
opinion.
In addition, we asked respondents about limitations on juvenile crimes.
Seventy-one percent were in favor of a policy that would restrict the use
of sentencing enhancements for prior offenses committed while a juvenile and 29 percent against. Taken together these ﬁndings suggest that
current guidelines in many states are inconsistent with public attitudes:
they count prior crimes that the public would disregard, and they assign
full weight to previous convictions that the public would discount.
Overall, the public opinion research suggests that the public overestimates both recidivism rates and the effectiveness of deterrent sentencing strategies and underestimates the inﬂuence of environmental causes
of crime (Roberts and White 1986; Redondo and Funes 1996). Public
sentencing preferences become more punitive when the offender has
prior convictions. There are limits, however; the public are sensitive to
proportionality in sentencing, and they oppose the more robust enhancements. The public support the use of look-back limits and restricting the
inclusion of juvenile priors. They also enhance punishment based on
older prior crimes less than for recent crimes. In all these respects, most
guidelines show some inconsistencies with public attitudes.
We recognize that proposals for drastic changes to PRE practices may
be met with strident opposition based in large part on the strong intuition
associated with their use. Both scholars and policy makers must think
carefully about the proper counsel to take from intuition. As Tonry
(2010, pp. 108–9) observes, in the not-so-distant past, common intuitions
supported the right of husbands to discipline wives, the treatment of homosexuality as a mental disorder, and the belief “that the sky would fall if
black people had equal access to public accommodation.” The better approach would be to treat intuition as a philosophical proposition or an
implicit hypothesis. We should then be able to offer logical proofs that
bear out the proposition for retributive rationales, or engage in empirical
hypothesis tests, where appropriate, for consequentialist positions.
9. Summary. Of all the desert-based theories, the grant of leniency to
ﬁrst offenders offers the most persuasive arguments and has the broadest
support, at least when the current crime is not very serious. In exceptional
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cases these arguments may also support leniency for an offender with a
single prior conviction. In our view, developed more fully below, sentence enhancements for repeat offenders should be limited because desert is increased only modestly, if at all, as the number of prior convictions
increases. Desert principles also require such enhancements to be reduced or eliminated if the offender has manifestly taken steps to try to
address the causes of his or her criminality. And because desert principles
give predominant weight to the goal of making punishment severity proportional to the seriousness of the conviction offense, recidivist enhancements must be “capped,” as is done in almost all sentencing guidelines
systems; at some point, additional prior convictions should not further
increase sentence severity.7
Indeed, we would go further than most guidelines systems in this respect in order to reduce the number of cases in which repeat offenders
receive penalties more severe than offenders convicted of more serious crimes. Our position is designed to be consistent with the view that
retributive principles deﬁne just punishment, within a fairly narrow
minimum-to-maximum range. Of course, if one adopts a more ﬂexible,
“limiting retributive” model (see, e.g., Morris 1974; Morris and Tonry
1990; Frase 2013; American Law Institute 2017), ﬁrst offenders and repeat offenders may be subject to a broader range of deserved penalties.
But even under that model, prior record enhancements must be much
more limited than they are now to maintain offense-based sentence proportionality.
B. Consequentialist Justiﬁcations
Apart from retributive rationales, it is possible that consequentialist (or
utilitarian) theories of punishment justify the imposition of PREs. Punishment in the name of rehabilitation, speciﬁc deterrence, general deter-

7
Of course, the beneﬁt of PRE “caps” depends on how they are structured; statutory
maximums also provide a kind of offense-based severity cap, yet these maximums are often
so high (because they are based on the worst-imaginable case) and so haphazard (because
they are enacted at different times) that they do little to promote sentencing proportionality. In most guidelines systems, however, recommended sentence ranges for offenders in
the highest criminal history category fall short of applicable statutory maximums, and they
fall well below those in systems with low or moderate PRE multipliers (highest-history vs.
lowest-history sentence severity). Granted, some systems have very high multipliers; but
many of those multipliers would be even higher if PREs were not capped. Finally, in most
guidelines systems the capped highest-history ranges are not haphazard; they are scaled in
at least rough proportion to offense severity ranking under the guidelines.
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rence, incapacitation, and denunciation all share the same goal of reducing offending—of either the person being punished or other would-be
offenders. If a punishment strategy systematically fails to reduce the harm
from crime from one of these or similar mechanisms, then the punishment is gratuitous and cannot be justiﬁed on consequentialist grounds.
Assuming that a given criminal history score distinguishes among different
levels of recidivism risk,8 the question is then, How does the additional
punishment imposed because of prior record reduce crime or harm?
1. Prison Does Not Rehabilitate. Sentencing offenders to prison in and
of itself, of course, does nothing to rehabilitate them, although some
programs administered in prison may do so. As currently designed,
PRE policies are simply unrelated to rehabilitation since criminal history increases punitiveness, and any assignment to programming occurs
separately. In some instances, the offender might be sentenced to a treatment program consistent with guidelines recommendations, but such
decisions are not triggered by PREs; if anything, having a prior offense
(or a certain type of prior offense) is more likely to make the offender
ineligible for treatment programs.
2. Longer Prison Terms Do Not Deter. There is very little research on
the deterrent effects of PRE-based marginal increases in punishment severity. However, studies of non-PRE increases in punishment are instructive. Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson (2009) conducted a comprehensive
review of 73 empirical studies that examined whether the experience of
punishment served to deter future offending. They concluded that while
the “scientiﬁc jury is still out . . . the great majority of studies point to a

8
This assumption warrants investigation. Criminal history scores may not account for
different levels of risk of reoffending among groups based on their prior records (e.g., are
offenders with a criminal history score of 4 more likely to reoffend than those with a criminal history score of 3?). For the most part, criminal history scores were developed in an ad
hoc, “back-of-the-envelope,” fashion (Tonry 2010). The one exception is the federal system, which based its criminal history score on two validated risk assessment instruments
(US Sentencing Commission 2004; Frase et al. 2015). For other jurisdictions, since scores
were not developed through empirical analysis, whether the cutoffs that divide categories
of offenders represent differences in the likelihood of reoffending is anybody’s guess: empirical validation of the score is the only way to assess predictive validity. Given the diverse
practices in what factors are included and how they are weighted, it seems likely that not all
criminal history scores are created equally for purposes of prediction. This research gap
needs attention. Surely the highest-history offenders will be more likely to recidivate than
ﬁrst offenders, but whether each step up in prior record score (1 to 2, 2 to 3, etc.) represents distinctions among classes of offenders is a more dubious proposition; since those
distinctions directly translate to more punishment, jurisdictions should undertake the task
to validate their scores.
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null or criminogenic effect of the prison experience on subsequent
offending” (p. 178).9 Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson discuss several reasons
why the experience of prison may not serve as an effective deterrent.
Under an economic model that explains behavior as the product of
cost-beneﬁt analyses, the prison experience may not be so unpleasant
as to alter subsequent behavior. Offenders may also engage in a version
of the “gambler’s fallacy,” believing that since they were previously
caught and punished it is highly unlikely they would be so unlucky as
to get caught and punished again. In addition, if a person’s decisionmaking is not guided by a cost-beneﬁt analysis, but by emotions or other
mechanisms instead (see Katz 1988), then the negative effects of the
prison experience would be irrelevant to future unlawful behavior.
Whatever the mechanics, neither receiving a prison sentence rather than
a nonprison sentence nor getting a longer sentence rather than a shorter
one appears to reduce the reoffending of the person punished. What is
worse, the prison experience may make individuals more likely to reoffend than they would otherwise have been with a nonprison (or shorter
prison) sentence (Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson 2009; Travis, Western, and
Redburn 2014).
Similarly, increased punishment does not appear to have a general deterrent effect. Several recent reviews of studies covering a range of methodological approaches come to this same conclusion (Durlauf and Nagin
2009; Nagin 2013; Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014; Frase and
Roberts, forthcoming). As Nagin (2013) observes, there is especially little
evidence that increasing already long prison sentences yields any general
deterrent effects, which leads him to question three-strikes statutes, life
without the possibility of parole sentences, and other long mandatory
sentencing policies. We would add PRE policies to this list: they mechanically make sentences longer without any evidence that they make the
public safer. Ultimately, Durlauf and Nagin (2009, p. 81) conclude,
“The key empirical conclusion . . . is that there is relatively little reliable
evidence of variation in the severity of punishment . . . having a substantial deterrent effect.” Accordingly, to the extent that sentencing guidelines impose increasing sanctions on the basis of higher prior records,

9
Subsequent studies on the speciﬁc deterrent effects of punishment continue to support
these conclusions (Meade et al. 2013; Nagin and Snodgrass 2013; Cochran, Mears, and
Bales 2014; Mitchell et al. 2016).
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for reasons of deterrence, they do so without support of empirical evidence. Perhaps there are contexts within the criminal law in which the
interactions of population type, punishment type, and dosage converge
for beneﬁcial deterrent effect. But these potential micro-speciﬁcations
aside, the takeaway from the current state of the research is that enhancing punishment—through PREs or by other means—does not enhance
deterrence.
3. The Costs of Incapacitation Mostly Outweigh the Beneﬁts. By deﬁnition, longer prison terms resulting from PREs incapacitate individuals
for longer. Undoubtedly, some crime is averted on this basis. But attempting to justify linear, incremental prior record enhancements for
all but the most serious and high-rate offenders stretches incapacitation
theory beyond the bounds of its logic.
It is questionable whether the evidence supports incapacitation as a
crime reduction policy at all—even in a highly selective form—because
of the difﬁculty in establishing any larger effects on crime rates. Research ﬁndings that attempt to measure the crime control effects of incapacitation vary. The National Academy of Sciences panel on mass incarceration (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014) concluded that the
preponderance is that increasing the size of prison populations does lead
to less crime. But at some point the marginal effect ﬂattens out: after the
quintupling of the prison population over the past half century, US
jurisdictions are probably past that point of diminishing returns.
At the very least, it is difﬁcult to assess any current crime control value
of incarceration. Studies usually frame results as elasticities, meaning
they estimate the percentage of crime reduction for every 1 percent increase in the imprisonment rate. Elasticity estimates vary by study, from
as high as 2.69 or 2.93 to as low as 2.06 (Abrams 2013; Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). An elasticity of 21 would indicate a 1 percent
decrease in crime for every 1 percent increase in imprisonment; an elasticity of 2.2 would indicate a decrease of 0.2 percent in crime for every
increase of 1 percent in prison—or, by extrapolation, a 1 percent decrease in crime for every 5 percent increase in imprisonment. As the National Academy review discusses, simulation studies suggest an elasticity
range of 2.1 to 2.3 while econometric studies range from ﬁndings of no
difference to 2.4. If, for example, the true effect were 2.2 (the midpoint
of both of those ranges), that would mean a 5 percent increase in the
prison population would be required to achieve a corresponding 1 percent decline in the crime rate. However, as the National Academy of
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Sciences recently reported, “we cannot arrive at a precise estimate, or
even a range of estimates, of the magnitude of the effect of incarceration
on crime rates” (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014, p. 141).
The academy panel reviewed several reasons why incapacitation
appears to have a modest (and potentially null) effect on crime. First,
for some crimes, we should expect no crime savings through incapacitation due to replacement effects (Piquero and Blumstein 2007). When one
individual is imprisoned for drug distribution, another simply steps up to
ﬁll the market vacuum. Second, many crimes involve co-offending—especially among young offenders. If a criminal act is a group effort, removing one group member will not necessarily result in any crime savings.
Third, as the scale of incarceration increases, the crime prevention returns of incapacitation diminish because the highest-rate offenders will
already have been skimmed off (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014).
Incapacitation is also an overly broad mechanism in that it captures
some lower-rate offenders for whom the costs of societal removal fail
to match the beneﬁts and holds many once violent or high-rate offenders
for far too long, well past the ages when they would have naturally
desisted from crime. For most, the frequency of criminal behavior peaks
in the teens and early 20s and declines steadily thereafter (Hirschi and
Gottfredson 1983; Sampson and Laub 1995; Piquero, Farrington, and
Blumstein 2007). By the time offenders reach their 40s and 50s, their
rates of offending will have substantially declined and most will have
desisted entirely, or soon will. Even the small subset of “chronic,” “career,” or “life course persistent” offenders display this pattern and eventually desist, albeit more slowly (Sampson and Laub 1995; US Sentencing Commission 2004, p. 28). Moreover, many guidelines PRE rules
largely or entirely ignore recent gaps or declines in offending. Yet the
emerging “redemption” literature shows that, on average, once an offender goes approximately 7 years without an arrest, his or her likelihood
of being subsequently rearrested is roughly the same as that of the population that has never been arrested (Kurlycheck, Brame, and Bushway
2006, 2007; Blumstein and Nakamura 2009; but see Bushway, Nieuwbeerta, and Blokland 2011).
For all of these reasons, incapacitation is a poor theoretical justiﬁcation
for prior record enhancements, at least when they are mechanically and
incrementally applied to all repeat offenders. The logic of incapacitation,
which may or may not hold up for high-rate recidivists, simply does not
extend to broad-based PRE policies. For the vast majority of offenders—
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those convicted of low- and medium-severity offenses—attempts to justify PREs through incapacitation are misplaced. Imposing a 30-year sentence on all ﬁrst-time misdemeanants would also prevent some future
criminal activity, but with absurd consequences to individual offenders,
their families, and communities, and the criminal justice infrastructure
as well. Any differences between such a policy and the use of PREs to incapacitate offenders at every level of a guidelines regime are differences
in degree, not in kind. Incapacitation fails to provide a convincing rationalization for existing PREs; the magnitude and frequency of these
enhancements are vastly greater than needed to achieve legitimate incapacitation goals in a cost-effective manner.
4. Any Crime Control Beneﬁts of Denunciation Are Uncertain. Many
writers have argued that punishment prevents crime through processes
quite different from those examined above, processes that depend on internalized values rather than fear of punishment, physical restraint, or
addressing criminogenic factors. This theory is most often called denunciation, but it has also been referred to as moral education, positive general prevention, or the communicative, educative, or expressive function
of punishment (Ewing 1929; Hart 1958; Andenaes 1966; Feinberg 1970;
Greenawalt 2001; Robinson 2008). The theory posits that criminal penalties serve to reinforce important social norms of law-abiding behavior
and relative crime seriousness: punishment conveys the wrongfulness of
the crime and also the degree of wrong and harm relative to other crimes
and offenders. These norms guide and restrain behavior even when the
chances of detection, conviction, and serious punishment are slight.10
Although denunciation theory has traditionally focused entirely on
the seriousness of the offender’s conviction offense, a version of this theory might provide a further crime control rationale for criminal history
enhancements. The question becomes, What norms are being rein-

10
Denunciation theory has also been justiﬁed on nonconsequentialist grounds—as
something that is the right thing to do even if it has no demonstrable beneﬁcial effects
(von Hirsch 1976, 1985, 1993; Duff 1986, 2001; Kleinig 1998; Markel 2009). Whether
consequentialist or not, most versions of the theory see it as a positive goal and justiﬁcation
for punishment. But under both the original and the recently revised Model Penal Code sentencing provisions, this concept is viewed as a negative, limiting principle. See American
Law Institute (1962), sec. 7.01(1)(c); (2017), sec. 6.06(2) (a sentence of incarceration
may be imposed when a lesser penalty would “depreciate the seriousness” of the offender’s
crime).
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forced when we punish recidivists more severely? The most plausible
recidivist-denunciation theory would seem to be that we need to counter
the destructive messages that repeat offenders are sending. Such offenders, by their disregard for the censure and penalties imposed at the time
of their prior sentences, risk lowering respect for the law and the courts,
undercutting the positive expressive functions of conviction and sentencing.
However, there are several problems with extending denunciation
theory in this way. Part of the appeal of denunciation is its tacit reassurance that if an offender shows disrespect for the law through repeated
offending, the legal system will answer in kind by elevating punishment.
A counter to that implicit need to elevate punishment is for society simply to accept the transaction: if we set an appropriate punishment range
for an offense and a particular offender chooses to reoffend and receive
that punishment, the law has done its job and no further escalation is
needed. The offender will get the appropriate and deserved punishment
each time. Because he is being punished, the public will not perceive an
erosion in respect for the rule of law, and accordingly there is no need
for escalated punishment. In addition, this extended denunciation could
undercut traditional denunciation by reducing the proportionality of the
punishment of the current crime. We could end up contradicting the
positive expressive value of punishment by imposing longer sentences
for less serious offenses due to PREs. In any case, the crime control effects of denunciation are diffuse and long-term, which makes those effects difﬁcult if not impossible to measure with any precision (or to separate from crime control beneﬁts produced by other mechanisms). In
short, denunciation theory does not provide a convincing crime control
rationale for recidivist enhancements.
5. Summary. Despite the intuitive appeal of PRE policies, it is difﬁcult to justify them on retributive grounds except perhaps to justify mitigation for ﬁrst offenders. There is certainly no cohesive, prevailing retributive theory of aggravation that would justify the linear increases in
PREs found in guidelines systems. Nor does rehabilitation or deterrence
provide strong justiﬁcation for these increases. The best current evidence suggests that, if anything, offenders become more likely to recidivate when exposed to more severe sanctions, not less. Some view incapacitation as a compelling policy when used selectively for a small
subpopulation of violent and high-rate offenders, but incapacitation does
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not justify increasing the punishment of all repeat offenders in the manner effected by PREs.

III. Adverse Consequences
While the intended crime-reduction effects of PREs are not realized or
achievable, a number of undesirable unintended consequences carry
widespread impacts. PREs exacerbate racial disparities, confound offensebased proportionality, undermine prison-resource prioritization, and compound issues related to ﬁscal strains on the prison system and taxpayers.
We explore each of these in turn.
A. Racial Disproportionality
Criminal history enhancements contribute signiﬁcantly to racial disproportionality in prison populations. Prior research, from both guidelines and nonguidelines jurisdictions, has found consistent racial differences in prior record (Frase 2009; Frase and Hester, forthcoming a).
And prior record, in turn, has consistently been found to exert a strong
effect on sentencing severity (Weidner, Frase, and Schultz 2005; Wang
et al. 2013; Ulmer, Painter-Davis, and Tinik 2016). First, PREs cause
higher proportions of black offenders to be sentenced to prison rather
than a community sentence (Frase 2009; Frase and Hester, forthcoming a). Second, criminal history affects decisions such as sentence length
and the likelihood of receiving a favorable departure from a guidelines
recommendation (Frase 2009). All told, the combined effects of prison
commitment and sentence length decisions work to the substantial disadvantage of black offenders. Research from Minnesota, for example,
shows that the percentage of black individuals receiving an executed
prison term is almost 50 percent greater than the percentage for white
individuals, and well over half of this racial difference is due to black individuals having higher criminal history scores (the remainder is due to
differences in offense severity and eligibility for mandatory prison terms;
Frase and Hester, forthcoming a). The average length of executed prison
sentences for black Minnesota offenders is about 20 percent longer
than the average for white offenders. The average prison months imposed
on black offenders in Minnesota for 2012–14 was 73 percent greater than
the average for white offenders (16.7 vs. 9.7, respectively). About half of
the racial differences in executed prison durations and prison months were
due to black individuals having higher criminal history scores.
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B. Undermining Offense-Based Proportionality
Sentencing proportionality is an important goal of almost all guidelines reforms; that is, more serious crimes should receive more severe
sanctions. Offense-based proportionality is particularly important under
a retributive theory of punishment, but it also has crime control value
(Frase 2013). Penalties that increase with crime seriousness send valuable
standard-setting and norm-reinforcing messages about the relative gravity of different crimes. Under guidelines, sentence severity depends primarily on two factors: the severity of the conviction offense and the magnitude of the offender’s criminal history score. Accordingly, the greater
the magnitude of criminal history enhancements, the less the sentence
depends on the severity of the offense being sentenced, lowering the proportionality of punishment for that offense.
Frase and Hester (forthcoming b) examine levels of proportionality on
guidelines grids using a method that measures how much criminal history enhancements undercut offense proportionality through overlapping
sentencing ranges, that is, when low-level offenses carry more severe
punishment than higher-severity offenses because of criminal history
enhancements. For example, in Minnesota the highest-history offenders
convicted at severity level 1 on the main grid (e.g., ﬂeeing a police ofﬁcer)
have a recommended executed prison sentence of 19 months, which is
more severe than the recommended 18-month suspended sentence speciﬁed for lowest-history offenders convicted at severity level 5 (e.g., residential burglary), four levels higher on the grid. Of the Minnesota main
grid’s 77 total cells, only 23 percent are what Frase and Hester deﬁne as
“fully proportionate,” meaning that the recommended sentences for
offenders convicted in those cells are more severe than all recommended
sentences at lower offense severity levels on the grid and are also less severe than all recommended sentences at higher levels on the grid. Notably, most of these fully proportionate cells are at the top of the Minnesota
grid, where few offenders are sentenced (because most offenders are
convicted of lower-severity crimes). In 2014, only 2 percent of Minnesota
offenders sentenced on that grid were convicted in a cell with a fully proportionate prison duration as deﬁned above.

C. Undermining Prison-Use Priorities
Many jurisdictions give higher priority to incarceration of offenders
convicted of violent crimes and use community-based options to sanc-
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tion nonviolent offenders.11 But nonviolent offenders often have high
recidivism rates (Langan and Levin 2002), so they tend to accumulate
higher criminal history scores. PREs thus greatly increase the number of
nonviolent offenders who receive recommended prison sentences, while
also increasing the lengths of their prison terms, undermining the violent crimes priority policy.
To demonstrate the effect of criminal history on prison commit recommendations, it is useful to focus on offenders in what we refer to as “zone 2”
of a guidelines grid; these are offenders convicted of low- or mediumseverity crimes who are recommended for a prison sentence only because
their criminal history score pushed them across the grid (Frase and Hester
2015). Frase and Hester (forthcoming b) report that in Minnesota, North
Carolina, and Washington in 2014, at least two-thirds of the zone 2
offenders were sentenced for a non–person offense. Moreover, even many
of the “person” crimes were not particularly violent. For example, 80 percent of Minnesota main-grid zone 2 person offenders convicted in 2014
were ranked at severity level 4 or lower on that grid (out of 11 levels)
and were not charged with having a dangerous weapon. Yet most of these
offenders were sent to prison because of their prior record status.
Targeting high-risk offenders for imprisonment is another commonly
endorsed sentencing priority (Frase 2015a; Roberts 2015a), although, as
we discussed above, it is easy to exaggerate the crime-preventive beneﬁts
of such a policy. Criminal history enhancements might help achieve this
goal if prior record closely approximated an offender’s recidivism risk
and if the additional punishment imposed were effective in counteracting
that higher risk. But many offenders with higher criminal history scores
are already well past their peak offending years or will pass that peak before they ﬁnish serving a prison term. These aging offenders become increasingly costly to support in prison (Fellner and Vinck 2012). Highmagnitude criminal history enhancements thus are likely to contribute
to an aged, low-risk, high-cost inmate population; sending many older
offenders to prison results in a mismatch between criminal history enhancement and efﬁcient risk management. At the same time PREs
overpredict risk for some younger offenders, further increasing the num-

11
See, e.g., Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (1984, pp. v, 97); Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission (2015, p. 22; goal of “incapacitation of the
violence-prone offender”); Kansas Sentencing Commission (2009, p. 2; goal of “promoting public safety by incarcerating violent offenders”).
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bers of low-risk offenders sent to or kept in prison. This occurs because
these enhancements are imposed according to a formula that disregards
the lower risk level of some offenders.
Finally, it is important to clarify what risk is being examined. Presumably, the greatest public and policy maker concerns would be over violent, sexual, and other traumatizing and physically harmful offenses
(Gottfredson and Gottfredson 1990; Vigorita 2003). But recidivism analysis almost always examines offending in much broader terms, often deﬁning recidivism as rearrest (regardless of whether a conviction follows)
for any nontrafﬁc offense. Thus, many offenders who are designated as
“high-risk” are likely to commit only additional drug crimes, low-level
property crimes, or public order offenses; they are not likely to commit
crimes that involve violence or traumatizing victimization. The public
and policy makers would do well to consider carefully whether sound
policy demands that these likely low-level recidivists be imprisoned at
a cost of tens of thousands of dollars per inmate per year.
D. Fiscal Impacts
Because PREs increase the number of individuals going to prison and
the lengths of their prison terms, they come with a substantial ﬁscal cost.
Frase and Hester (forthcoming b) estimated the costs attributable to
PREs in Kansas, Minnesota, and North Carolina for 2014. They found
a wide range of the bed needs imposed in 2014 that were attributable
to the zone 2 offenders (high-history, low and medium offense severity).
In Kansas, 36 percent of all prison commits came from zone 2; in Minnesota it was 51 percent and in North Carolina 18 percent. The corresponding bed needs attributable to zone 2 were 20 percent for Kansas,
36 percent for Minnesota, and 13 percent for North Carolina.12 Frase
and Hester estimate the ﬁscal impacts in 2014 were $28 million for Kansas,
$160 million for Minnesota, and $131 million for North Carolina. These
are prison beds occupied by medium- to low-severity offenders who are
recommended to prison only because of their prior convictions.
Frase and Hester also examined the ﬁscal costs in Minnesota that ﬂow
from the other problematic criminal history effects noted above: race

12
The percentage of bed needs from zone 2 should be lower than the percentage of total
prison commitments from zone 2 because, by deﬁnition, zone 2 does not include the
highest-severity offenders who receive the longest prison terms, often measured in decades.
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disproportionality, confounded prison bed prioritization, and the agecrime issue. They estimated that racial overrepresentation due to criminal history amounts to $25 million per year in prison operation costs, that
over $90 million per year is allocated for zone 2 non–person offenders,
and that almost $50 million per year is spent on zone 2 offenders who
were 40 or older at sentencing.
In many guidelines jurisdictions, governments are allocating tens of
millions of dollars per year to imprison aging low-risk offenders; these
“investments” are yielding greater racial disparities. For many readers,
moral and ethical concerns will be paramount to ﬁscal considerations,
particularly concerning an issue like racial disparity. Nevertheless, given
the salience of ﬁscal responsibility for some policy makers, it is worth emphasizing both the underlying adverse outcomes and the concomitant
steep price tag. There may be justiﬁable reasons for imposing PREs,
though we have struggled to ﬁnd a convincing retributive or consequentialist rationale that would even remotely support the linear, multiplicative, aggravation-style PRE policies currently in place. Since the moral
and ﬁnancial consequences are so weighty, any such justiﬁcations for
PREs should be carefully examined and convincingly articulated.

IV. Conclusion
Offenders pay again and again for their prior crimes, and so do their
families, their communities, and the general public. There are many serious collateral consequences of criminal convictions, but paying again
for past crimes is especially pronounced in the United States. The “recidivist premium” exists in almost all modern sentencing regimes, but
it is particularly strong—or, at least, much more visible—in American
state and federal jurisdictions that have implemented sentencing guidelines. Almost all of these guidelines regimes incorporate criminal history
scoring formulas that greatly increase the recommended and imposed
penalties for offenders with prior convictions.
The high cost and adverse effects of prior record sentence enhancements might be tolerable if they served important punishment purposes,
but all of the potential justiﬁcations for these enhancements are weak.
Despite repeated and diverse scholarly effort, the retributive justiﬁcation—that a repeat offender’s latest crime is more blameworthy because
of his prior convictions—is unpersuasive except perhaps as a basis to
mitigate sentences for some ﬁrst offenders. The crime control ratio-

Prior Record Enhancements

243

nale—that a repeat offender poses a higher risk of further crime, thus justifying more severe punishment—is unproven and, in many respects,
implausible. Almost no American guidelines system has empirically validated the risk-predictive accuracy of its criminal history score and score
components (and the formulas and components vary widely across
guidelines systems; Frase et al. 2015). Moreover, even if a particular formula predicts risk fairly accurately, with limited under- and overprediction, the more severe penalties imposed under these formulas are
not likely to have cost-effective crime-reducing effects. Longer prison
terms do not rehabilitate or speciﬁcally deter most offenders, and they
make many of them more crime-prone. The general deterrent claims
of longer terms seem particularly implausible given what we know about
the marginal deterrent effects of higher penalties.
Prisons sometimes prevent crime by mere incapacitation, but routine
prior record enhancements seem guaranteed to overpredict risk for many
offenders (especially older offenders) while underpredicting risk for
others. Although opinion research consistently shows public support for
giving higher penalties to repeat offenders, popular views are largely intuitive and not based on particular punishment goals and rationales. New
research does show, however, that the public endorses limits on the
magnitude of these enhancements, on the use of very old convictions,
and on the counting of offenses committed when the offender was a juvenile. In each of those respects, the public would place greater limits on
prior record enhancements than are found in many guidelines systems.
Much is still unknown about these important sentencing policy issues,
and we need further research in one or more guidelines systems on the
following topics:
•

•
•

•

How well does the criminal history score and each score component predict future crime, especially serious and violent crime, and
how do nonscore factors (e.g., current offense, offender age) affect
prediction accuracy?
What are the crime control beneﬁts of the more severe sentences
imposed because of prior record?
What are the ﬁscal costs and adverse impacts (racial disparate impact, offense disproportionality, increased numbers of nonviolent
and aging inmates) of prior record enhancements?
Which components of each system’s prior record formula have major
racial impacts, and do those components have strong justiﬁcation?
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To what extent is public support for prior record enhancements
based on assumptions of higher levels of desert, higher risk, or
other speciﬁc rationales?

Reform cannot wait until all of these questions are answered. On the basis of current knowledge, here is how we would design a model system of
prior record enhancement under sentencing guidelines:
1. Criminal history scores should include only components with the
strongest normative and empirical justiﬁcations. Many existing formulas include troubling components, including juvenile court adjudications; adult misdemeanor convictions; adult convictions from
many years earlier (many systems have no look-back limits at all
or have limits that formally or in practice do not exclude convictions entered many decades earlier); custody status points (which
double-count the prior conviction and, in case of release revocation, triple-count the current offense; this should just be a factor
judges may consider, particularly on the question of “disposition”
noted below); heavy weighting of prior crimes according to severity (there is little evidence tying prior severity to future risk); and
“patterning” enhancements for offenders previously convicted of
the same crime (this is sometimes a valid factor for courts to consider, but temporal and other variations do not support routine,
formulaic enhancement).
2. Recommended custody-duration enhancements should not increase at a steady or uniform rate as the criminal history score rises.
Retributive and risk-based rationales justify a substantial difference
in penalty severity, between ﬁrst offenders and low-history repeat
offenders (e.g., history score of 1); however, the pace of enhancement should be much more modest as offender scores continue to
rise.13
3. To limit the costs and other adverse effects of prior record enhancements and, in particular, to maintain proportionality be13
Rather than having straight linear increases in prison length by criminal history score,
as current guidelines do, PREs should follow a two-stage or bent-line approach that
roughly resembles the shape of a hockey stick held with the blade pointing down (Frase
and Roberts, forthcoming). For low-history offenders the PRE should reﬂect the ﬁrstoffender discount, meaning that PRE would rise sharply at ﬁrst (the blade end of the stick).
Subsequently, PREs should follow a modest line with little slope.
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tween sentence severity and conviction offense seriousness, the
recommended duration for highest-history offenders should not
be more than two times greater than the recommended sentence
for no-history (or lowest-history) offenders. This “doubling” limit
ensures that an offender’s prior record never counts more than his
current crime.14
Offense proportionality should be promoted by providing that
the ranges of recommended (typical-case) sentences for adjoining
offense severity levels do not overlap: high-history offenders
should not be recommended for prison terms that are more severe
than recommended terms for low-history offenders committing
more serious crimes (excluding ﬁrst offenders, to accommodate
the mitigations we propose above).
Additional mitigation for ﬁrst offenders should be expressly authorized. First-offender mitigation has the strongest retributive
rationale and also a strong crime control basis: these offenders deserve a second chance, and most of them will not be seen again in
criminal court. At least one guidelines system expressly recognizes
the special status of these offenders (Boerner and Lieb [2001,
pp. 84–86], discussing Washington’s ﬁrst-offender “waiver” provision). Finally, the public strongly supports mitigation for ﬁrst
offenders (Hester et al. 2017).
Judges should have authority to adjust the sentence upon a ﬁnding
that the offender’s criminal history score does not accurately reﬂect the risk of serious recidivism; judges already have authority
to depart based on atypical offense facts, and the same should
be true for offender-related factors.
A particularly strong basis to mitigate sentences, even for offenders
with a number of prior convictions, would exist in which the court
ﬁnds that, notwithstanding his most recent crime, the offender has
made substantial efforts to address the causes of his offending. Such
mitigation should almost always be recognized if the current offense is not very serious and was preceded by a substantial crime-

14
Tonry (2017) has recently suggested the premium should never be over 1.5. Although
selecting a maximum premium is somewhat arbitrary, we offer an upper limit of 2.0, which,
to us, has an inherent, natural appeal: however much the past counts, surely it should not
count more than the present criminal act. And 2.0 is the upper bound; in most cases, it
should count much less.
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free period since the offender’s last conviction. Another strong case
for discretionary (or even presumptive) mitigation would be for
older offenders, especially those whose recent crimes are declining
in frequency or seriousness. One of the most serious defects of current prior record enhancement formulas is that they ignore the
well-documented lower risk of aging offenders.
In most existing guidelines systems, adoption of the model provisions
above would substantially reduce the costs and adverse impacts of prior
record enhancements. The result would be a sentencing system that is
fairer, more proportional, and more efﬁcient but no less effective in controlling crime.
While our primary focus in this essay has been on prior record enhancements under sentencing guidelines, in almost every instance our arguments carry the same or greater force for other types of record-based enhancements such as three-strikes and repeat-offender statutes. These
enhancements often involve additional imprisonment for decades or for
life; yet their relationship to valid punishment purposes, whether retributive or consequentialist, is as dubious, if not more so, than the justiﬁcations
for substantial guidelines PREs. Likewise, the undesirable consequences of
three-strikes and repeat-offender laws are as serious as or more serious
than the consequences we have examined in this essay. All substantial prior
record enhancements worsen racial disparities, reduce the proportionality
of punishment relative to the crime being sentenced, and increase the size
and cost of prison populations. When such enhancements, whether under
guidelines or repeat-offender statutes, are applied to aging and other lowrisk offenders or to those convicted of nonviolent crimes, they also undermine prison resource priorities.
Like the larger problems of mass incarceration and mass supervision,
prior record enhancements have been overused and underevaluated. All
of these policies need to be reexamined and substantially cut back to levels
that are more fair and more cost-effective.
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